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The politics of gender have dominated Western conversation concerning Iran 
since the Islamic Republic’s founding more than three decades ago. In the West, 
one regularly discovers articles1 lamenting the apparent slide backwards that the 
Islamic Republic has taken with regards to women’s rights. Certainly, 
contemporary life for Iranian women is problematic. However, as Leila Abu-
Lughod has noted, obsessive focus on the symbolic markers of women’s 
oppression (often clothing) in the Middle East tends to lead one into an Orientalist 
and essentialist trap that wipes away any understanding of Iranian women’s 
agency in their own lives: “Is it not a gross violation of women's own 
understandings of what they are doing to simply denounce the burqa as a 
medieval imposition?”2   
In reality, Iranian women, from the early twentieth century to the years 
following the 1979 revolution, have interacted with state and society in varied, 
complex ways, sometimes successfully and sometimes unsuccessfully, in an 
attempt to achieve gender equality. In this paper, then, I will examine the history 
of women’s movements in Iran. I will first focus on pre-revolutionary history. 
Through the lens of three major events, the Tobacco Boycott and Constitutional 
Revolution, Reza Shah’s 1936 unveiling law, and Mohammed Reza Shah’s 1963 
White Revolution, I will demonstrate how the use of a Western, secular, humanist 
discourse surrounding female emancipation both failed to provide legitimate 
gender equality and served to reinforce clerical and traditional views of women’s 
emancipation as dangerous to the fabric of Iranian society. I will then examine the 
Islamic revolution and its aftermaths. Specifically, I will show that Islamist 
revolutionaries moralized women’s political participation in the public sphere and 
thus allowed Islamist women, in the decades following the revolution, to develop 
an emancipatory framework that is founded in a feminist exegesis of the Quran; 
what is known as Islamic feminism.  
The history of modern women’s action in Iran begins with the Tobacco 
Boycott of 1890 and ensuing Constitutional Revolution. In both cases women 
proved invaluable, lending concrete physical support to the boycott and the 
constitutional movement. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Revolution also 
marked the beginning of a construction, in the Iranian national consciousness, of 
both women’s emancipation and female political participation as immoral, 
corrupting, and Western. This construction was further reinforced during the 
Pahlavi dynasty, when programs of rapid modernization and Westernization, in 
which the appearance of gender equality was considered critical, were instituted.  
The Pahlavis introduced two legal packages, the 1936 unveiling law and 
1963 White Revolution, which, superficially, attempted to allow space for women 
to integrate into, and engage with, the public political sphere. Ultimately, though, 
                                                        
1 http://www.boredpanda.com/iranian-women-fashion-1970-before-islamic-revolution-iran/ 
2 Abug-Lughod, 785 
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the laws failed to achieve their stated aim. Women’s emancipation, as a 
component of the Pahlavis’ plan for Westernization and modernization, was 
derided as immoral and dangerous to Iranian society. The problem, as I identify in 
this paper, was primarily discursive: the Pahlavi dynasty and those women 
activists who worked within its institutional confines made use of a modern, 
Western mode of discourse, which could not adequately challenge the traditional, 
Islamic discourse of the clerical establishment and those who opposed women’s 
emancipation. This changed quite drastically during the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  
The revolution, in which female revolutionaries were lionized by the 
highest religious figures, opened the doors of Islamic discourse to women; 
especially with regards to women’s rights and female emancipation. Certain 
women, after the revolution, made use of the new, Islamic mode of discourse to 
push for and develop what some scholars have called Islamic Feminism, that is: 
“a feminist discourse and practice articulated within an Islamic Paradigm”.3 They 
have made use of classic, Islamic, theological tools, such as ijtihad, or 
interpretation, to reinterpret and reclaim Islam and Quranic verses as feminist.  
 
From the Tobacco Boycott of 1890 until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, 
Iranian women on the front lines of progressive social and political movements 
aimed at securing gender equality and developing a feminist consciousness. These 
movements took the form of mass protests, in the case of the Tobacco Boycott 
and Constitutional Revolution or top-down political action, in the case of the 1936 
unveiling laws and 1963 White Revolution. These movements, whether broad-
based or top-down, attempted to institute a secular, humanist, and, most 
importantly, Western interpretation of gender equality. Unfortunately, the use of a 
Western, secular, humanist discourse surrounding female emancipation both 
failed to provide legitimate gender equality and served to reinforce clerical and 
traditionalist views of women’s emancipation as dangerous to the very fabric of 
Iranian society.  
Several of the ideas outlined above are rather slippery and, for the 
purposes of this paper, will require more nuanced and in-depth definitions, 
namely: my delineation of legitimate equality and the broader idea of a Western, 
secular, feminist politics. First, I consider a legitimate policy of gender equality to 
be one that is both legal (i.e. enshrined in law) and reflected, or visible, within 
broader society. Thus, a movement which advocates for gender equality and 
which may be supported by a majority of people is illegitimate if it does not rest 
on a political and legal foundation of equality; that is, if legal code does not 
support gender equality. Conversely, if a legal and political movement is not 
supported in society at large, it too is illegitimate. This is not meant as a critique 
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of attempts to build gender equality either through law or through social 
movements; rather, as will shortly become clear, it is a necessary definition in 
understanding the history and development of feminist consciousness in Iran.  
Secondly, a Western, secular feminist discourse is one that takes a 
humanist approach in justifying female empowerment and gender equality. This 
approach takes as self-evident that women and men deserve equal treatment and 
are equally capable of participating in society; it was forcefully articulated by 
Zayneb Pasha, a female leader in the Tobacco Boycott of 1890: “If you men do 
not have the courage to punish the oppressors…wear our veil and go home. Do 
not claim to be men; we will fight instead of you”.4 That is, if men are unable to 
accomplish the necessary goals of fighting tyranny they should allow women to 
take charge because women are equally capable; men and women are intrinsically 
equal.  
 Returning to Iran, in 1890 the Shah of Iran at the time, Nasser al-Din, 
granted a concession over all Iranian tobacco to Great Britain, which led to 
widespread protests that cut across social, class, and gender lines within the 
country. Despite attempts to keep them a secret, word of the concessions got out 
to the general public and, supported in part by edicts from clergy and leaders 
outside Iran, a broad swath of the Iranian public took to the streets in protest. The 
protests were unprecedented but not unexpected: Western business had been 
encroaching into the Iranian economy for some time. While these encroachments 
sometimes brought prosperity to Iranian businessmen, they more often 
transformed traditional economic structures and ruined native industries.5 Quite 
naturally, then, Western intrusion into the Iranian economic sphere was met with 
anger and resentment, which quickly evolved into a broader rejection of Western 
philosophical and social values, including women’s emancipation.  
Women played a key role in the Tobacco protests; when the protests first 
erupted, women immediately joined in, marching in organized lines at the front of 
the crowds.6 As the protests evolved into a general boycott on the consumption 
and sale of tobacco, women’s groups, known as anjomans, turned militant. They 
armed themselves with “rifles, clubs, and bags full of rocks, hidden under their 
black chadors”7 and attacked merchants and soldiers who refused to support the 
boycott. Surprisingly, even the Shah’s wives “stood in solidarity with ordinary 
Iranians in boycotting tobacco”.8 Faced with opposition from all sides of society, 
the Shah had little choice but to cancel the tobacco concession—Iranians and, 
especially, Iranian women had been successful. In leading protests; in militantly 
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upholding the boycott, Iranian women recognized the power they held to effect 
change. The Iranian women on the front lines of the Tobacco Boycott represented 
a burgeoning understanding of women’s social and political strength; a growth in 
feminist consciousness in Iran. Understandably, women soon acted upon this 
consciousness to advocate for domestic political change during the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1905-1911.  
 With the success of the Tobacco Boycott grew a greater nationalist and 
anti-imperialist sentiment, culminating in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-
1911, in which women, once again, fought on the front lines. Initially, as with the 
Tobacco Boycott, anjomans joined forces with members of disparate social 
classes to push for the general goals of constitutionalism, checks and balances, 
and an Iranian society free of despotism. As the revolution proceeded, though, 
militant anjomans, reminiscent of those in of the Tobacco Boycott, took up arms 
in support of the movement. Some “took up clubs and acted as bodyguards”9 for 
prominent clergy members who supported the constitution, while others went so 
far as to enter government buildings with revolvers and threaten to “kill their own 
husbands and sons and leave behind their own dead bodies”10 if constitutionalism 
was not enacted. As in the Tobacco Boycotts, the Shah was forced to concede: in 
1906, a constitution was drafted that severely curtailed the monarch’s power. It 
would seem that women had again successfully demonstrated their collective 
ability to enact political change. Unfortunately, while women who had fought and 
died for the constitutionalist cause were honored as “martyrs of freedom”,11 
female participation in the revolution was not materially rewarded: the 
constitution “completely ignored and omitted rights for women”; 12  they were 
barred from voting, from running for office, even from acquiring education. 
Constitutionalist women were incensed: women “did not take part in the 
Revolution to have their rights trampled upon”.13  
Despite their anger, in the years following the revolution, as disagreements 
over constitutionalism and the future of the country evolved into an outright civil 
war, women remained explicitly nationalist and constitutionalist. Women 
financed, supported, and again took up arms for the constitutionalist cause, for the 
most part without crossing into expressly emancipatory territory. Those who did 
practice an emancipatory politics, who advocated for the radical ideals of 
women’s education, women’s suffrage, or release from veiling laws, were 
castigated. In one particularly memorable moment, a group of women took to the 
streets of Tehran shouting pro-constitutional slogans and removing their chadors. 
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Their actions immediately resulted in public indignation: the anti-veil protestors 
were condemned, even by other constitutionalist women; their actions derided as 
those of “a bunch of prostitutes”. 14  Thus, while women were celebrated as 
“martyrs of freedom” while strictly fighting for a patriarchal constitution, they 
were castigated, pilloried as immoral prostitutes, and dismissed the moment they 
began to advocate for a personal emancipation.  
The failure of the Constitutional Revolution to achieve legitimate gender 
equality was primarily one of differing discourses: radical anjomans had pushed 
for equality through humanist arguments, by declaring that women were 
intrinsically able to “correct the law… and appoint governors… [and] destroy the 
roots of tyranny and oppression”15, but opposition relied on religious and Islamic 
arguments to outline the impossibility of such equality. Arguments against 
women’s rights were presented by clerics who argued that “God had not given 
them [women] the capacity needed for taking part in politics”.16 In the cultural 
and discursive environment of the time, defined by a growing distrust of all 
Western ideals due to Western economic disruption in the previous decades, the 
traditional, religious argument was stronger than the humanist one: women’s 
place in Iranian society was ordained by God himself. The Constitutional 
Revolution and its aftermath demonstrated the inadequacy of humanist 
approaches to achieving gender equality in Iran; there was simply no way to 
develop a broad-based, modern, secular movement for women’s rights in the face 
of popular opposition that viewed female emancipators as “prostitutes”; that 
considered all emancipatory action the result of a “conspiracy of ‘morally corrupt’ 
Westernized intellectuals” 17 , as one cleric put it, to destroy Iranian society. 
Despite this failure, future emancipatory action remained situated within a 
Western, secular discourse. However, further attempts, as in 1936, to develop 
women’s emancipation within such a Western discourse were resoundingly 
rejected by the traditional and clerical classes.  
 In 1936, Reza Shah unilaterally banned the use of the veil. The ban was 
delivered as part of a broader push towards a Western modernity, as such the 
policy failed to secure legitimate female emancipation and, in fact, isolated a large 
segment of Iranian women from society while further constructing women’s 
emancipation as Western and immoral.  
 From the outset of his rule, Reza Shah maintained a strict policy of nation 
building and modernization that was built on a specific conception of modernity 
that held as paramount the “imitation of certain aspects of Western societies”.18 
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To that end, taxes were imposed, railroads and factories were built, and the 
military was greatly expanded. With regards to women, the Shah believed the 
visible entrance of women into the public sphere was “a hallmark of 
modernization”.19 Following a trip to Turkey in the early 1930s, where Ataturk 
had already banned hijab, the Shah unilaterally barred the use of the veil among 
Iranian women and ordered them to dress in “Western-style clothing”.20  The 
policy was militantly enforced: women who ventured outside wearing a veil were 
liable to be attacked and forcibly disrobed by police.21  
While the policy could be construed as an attempt to emancipate women, 
this was belied by the Shah’s decision to, at the time of the law’s passage, 
dismantle all independent women’s organizations, women’s magazines, and 
women’s newspapers that existed in Iran.22  The unveiling policy was enacted 
strictly to force a rapid Westernization of Iran, not emancipate Women. Although 
the Shah’s new policy was supported by some middle and upper-class women, 
leaving the house unveiled was, for the many lower-class and religious women 
who had been socialized to accept the veil as natural, akin to going out naked.23 
Facing state violence if they disobeyed, following Reza Shah’s decree many of 
these religious women simply refused to leave their homes. While the Shah’s 
unveiling policy was, in theory, aimed at drawing women visibly into the public 
sphere, in practice it did the exact opposite. Furthermore, the law underscored and 
reinforced the general feeling that the West was the source of moral decay in Iran. 
A cleric named Ruhollah Khomeini best put feeling into words: “the dishonorable 
act of unveiling… inflicted moral and material damage on our country and is 
forbidden by the law of God and the Prophet”.24 The 1936 law, then, did two 
things: first, the Shah’s dismantlement of female civic society and the women’s 
spaces compounded with the social reality of Iran at the time, where the veil was 
understood as natural, moral, and religious, led to the exclusion of a large 
majority of Iranian women from the public sphere. Second, the law reinforced 
underlying assumptions about the immorality of the West and the connection 
between such immorality and women’s emancipation. It did not achieve 
legitimate gender equality. The law’s failure can be read as a failure of Western-
style humanism to justify the perceived immorality of unveiling; that is, the law 
failed precisely because it imitated Western norms. A similar pattern emerged in 
later years, as Reza Shah’s son, Mohammed Reza Shah, pursued female suffrage 
in 1963.   
                                                        
19 Keddie, 100 
20 Keddie, 100 
21 Keddie, 100 
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 In the years following the 1936 unveiling law, Iran was wracked by 
various political and social events: World War Two brought foreign dominance to 
Iran; Reza Shah was deposed, his son, Mohammed Reza Shah, was installed; the 
early fifties saw the rise of a truly populist, democratic nationalist in the form of 
Mohammed Mossadeq, who was promptly ousted by a cadre of royalists and CIA 
agents. In the wake of the Mossadeq affair, Mohammed Reza Shah began to 
consolidate his own political power, developing a brutal internal intelligence 
service, SAVAK, and tightening his grip over Iran. Mohammed Reza Shah also 
worked to extend his father’s program of Western-style modernization, and in 
1963 instituted a series of reforms, known as the White Revolution, which 
included female suffrage among its provisions.25  
 The 1963 White Revolution was, without a doubt, a deeply significant 
moment for women’s history in Iran. The legal gains made through the 
Revolution represented a leap forward in terms of women’s political and legal 
recognition in Iran. This said, despite the Revolution’s positive effects, the 
enactment of female suffrage failed to alter social conceptions of women’s 
emancipation as an immoral encroachment by the West into Iranian society.  
 In January 1963, specifically in response to American “reform 
pressures”26, Mohammed Reza Shah announced that he would put to referendum 
a six-point program of social reform, entitled the White Revolution, which 
included the extension of the right to vote to women. The Pahlavi government’s 
connection to the United States was well recognized in Iran at the time. 27 
Unsurprisingly then, the clerical establishment was vehemently opposed to the 
White Revolution and the referendum, calling its supporters “the enemies of 
Islam”,28 yet again invoking a connection between Westernization and destruction 
of traditional, Islamic society. Clerical opposition was, ostensibly, tied to issues of 
dictatorship and “subservience to Western Powers”.29 However, one would be 
remiss not to acknowledge the importance of women’s suffrage as a point of 
contention among Iranian clerics at the time: just a year before the Revolution 
was launched, Ruhollah Khomeini had privately warned the prime minister that 
“the franchise of women… is contrary to Islam”.30 Despite the opposition, the 
referendum, “like most such referendums”31 at the time, passed with a massive 
majority.32  
                                                        
25 See Axworthy for a general history of pre-revolutionary Iran. 
26 Keddie, 144 
27 Keddie, 144 
28 Paidar, 145 
29 Keddie, 146 
30 Paidar, 143 
31  Keddie, 145 
32 Derayeh, 150 
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The rather explicit merging of subservience to the United States and 
women’s suffrage incensed the religious and traditional sectors of society. In a 
further response to the passage of the White Revolution, Khomeini began to 
preach against the Shah, instigating a protest movement that “included thousands 
of clergy, shopkeepers, office workers, teachers and students”.33  The Pahlavi 
regime responded violently, leading to the death of hundreds of individuals.34 
While it was claimed that a majority of Iranians supported the White Revolution, 
a sizable and broad swath of society, clearly, did not. The discourse of 
modernization that the Pahlavi regime championed, once again, was unable to 
engender public support or challenge religious discourse that held women’s 
suffrage to be “contrary to Islam”. Thus, while the White Revolution did secure 
women’s suffrage, it did so at the cost of alienating large amounts of the 
population and cementing the connection between women’s emancipation, 
immorality, and the West in the minds of ordinary Iranians.  
 By the waning years of the Pahlavi dynasty, political action had failed to 
achieve wide social acceptance of women’s emancipation or legitimate social 
equality. These failures were primarily discursive: Iranian women’s action had 
been structured within a secular, humanist discourse, inimical to traditional 
society, which was further compounded by the efforts of the Pahlavis elder and 
junior to tie female emancipation to their program of modernization and 
Westernization. Specifically, the 1936 unveiling law and 1963 White Revolution 
both used women’s emancipation as a tool towards greater Westernization of 
society. Thus, in a sort of self-perpetuating cycle, emancipatory political action 
under the Pahlavis failed to create legitimate equality because it was considered 
intimately tied to the West and at the same time served to further the conception 
of emancipation as corrupting, immoral, and Western. This concept was perhaps 
best captured by Jal Ale-Ahmad’s popular and influential essay, Gharbzadegi, 
which viewed the end-result of the Pahlavis’ emancipatory politics as the 
gharbzadegi, or Westoxicated, woman: a “super-consumerist” who was a 
“propagator of the corrupt culture of the West”; a culture which was actively 
“undermining the moral fabric of society”.35 But, precisely because the clerical 
establishment saw the Pahlavi-supported emancipation of women as immoral and 
dangerous, when the opportunity arose for revolutionary action, Islamists chose to 
champion the cause of “true” women’s rights, dramatically altering the valence of 
women’s political action during and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  
 
In 1978, widespread, anti-Shah protests erupted across Iran. The protests, 
which quickly evolved into a full-scale revolution, involved the large and active 
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participation of women. In fact, up to a third of the demonstrators in the 
revolution were women;36 a figure made more impressive by the fact that many of 
the demonstrations and protests numbered in the millions.37 While leadership of 
the revolutionary movement was confined, generally, to radical, Islamist, men, 
like Khomeini (who had, by the time of the revolution, come to be known as 
Ayatollah Khomeini) women were free to participate in any other aspects of the 
struggle that they wished to take up. Women took part in both peaceful and 
violent protests; dug trenches, fought in street battles; and joined guerrilla 
movements, strikes, and boycotts.38 Perhaps most importantly, women acted as a 
motivational foundation to the greater revolutionary movement: supporting 
friends and family; working as doctors and nurses; cooking; and spreading 
“oppositional literature and tapes”.39 Women, from the start of the revolution, 
were active in nearly all levels of the public landscape of protests and 
demonstrations.  
 As the revolution continued, women’s participation increasingly came to 
represent an Islamist view. This happened for two reasons. First, as the 
revolutions proceeded, “those opposed to the shah’s regime increasingly saw as 
bad everything the regime saw as good”.40  The regime had long championed 
secularism, Westernization, and modernization; logically, to register opposition to 
the regime and its immoral politics, women chose to embrace Islam and 
traditionalism. Second, secular, leftist, or otherwise moderate revolutionary 
elements refused to take up the question of women’s rights “because of its 
association with the policies of the Shah’s regime”. 41  But radical, Islamist 
elements, precisely because they considered women to be “victims of the Shah’s 
[immoral] regime”, 42  believed they had the duty of advancing women’s true 
interests. Islamists explicitly pointed to “women as the source of change within 
society”.43 Thus, women increasingly chose to don the chador and hijab,44 which 
became the physical symbol of the rejection of Pahlavi values, in effect 
transforming religious garb into powerful, anti-Shah political symbols. Female 
activists during the revolution, then, were both voicing anger with the Western, 
corrupting, and immoral gender policies of the Shah and pragmatically aligning 
themselves with the only revolutionary elements, Islamists, who promised to 
further women’s rights and gender equality.  
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 The result of the alignment between Islamists and women was profound: 
women were lionized and their political participation sanctioned as divinely moral 
by the highest organs of the Shii’a establishment. Islamist leaders unconditionally 
approved of women’s participation in the revolution; Khomeini called women’s 
involvement “one of the blessings of [the revolutionary] movement”, 45  and 
exclaimed that women were serving the revolutionary cause in a manner that 
exceeded that of men.46 The Islamists transformed female political action from its 
pre-revolutionary construction as Western and immoral, into a decidedly moral, 
Islamic act. The effects were immediately obvious: during the revolution, large 
numbers of women “disobey[ed] their husbands and fathers on political 
grounds”, 47  left the house, and felt able to mix and demonstrate politically 
alongside revolutionary men. The reconstruction of female political action as 
moral, though, had much farther reaching consequences: it allowed women to 
challenge gender oppression within a discourse that the new, post-revolutionary 
Islamic Republic had to engage with; that is, sanctification of women’s political 
action as Islamic meant that emancipatory women, unlike in the Pahlavi days, 
could access a religious and traditional discourse that resonated with the 
population and government and which could not be brushed aside as Western or 
corrupt: women’s political action was, as Khomeini had decreed during the 
revolution, entirely moral.  
  
 Immediately following the ouster of the Shah, Khomeini and other 
Islamists carefully purged the new Republic of all secular opposition. In a series 
of impressive political moves, Khomeini took power; clerics, for the first time, 
were in control of both the religious and political establishments of Iran. 
Paradoxically, the result of clerical control over political structures was the 
creation of a constitution that represented a “total reversal of the history of 
clerical opposition to women’s participation in the economy, politics and 
society”.48 In order to retain the large, female support it had enjoyed during the 
revolution, the new Islamist regime enshrined women’s right to political 
participation in the Islamic republic. However, within several years the regime’s 
professed commitments to gender equality were severely curtailed.  
Immediately following the institution of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the 
new government walked back its apparent commitment to women during the 
revolution, instituting mandatory hijab; purging secular women from government; 
and reinstituting shari’a with regards to family law.49 The new regime, though, 
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had, in the constitution, enshrined women’s right to political participation; 
Khomeini could not ignore the legal and moral space women now occupied in the 
public, political sphere. Thus, Islamist women, faced with the regressive gender 
policies which the Islamic Republic was championing, were able to engage the 
religious establishment of the state in dialogue, presenting “female-centered 
interpretations of Islam”;50  advocating for woman-friendly laws. The state, in 
order to remain credible as both the political and religious supremacy in Iran, had 
to respond; cite authoritative religious and legal sources; offer rationalizations and 
proofs.51 In doing so, the state and Islamist women created what legal scholar 
Louise Halper calls a “process of public engagement”52, a national dialogue with 
which the Islamist regime was required to engage in order to remain credible as a 
religious and political authority. This national dialogue further legitimized the 
political actions of Islamist women. 
The result of this public engagement was a slew of successes for Iranian 
women. Due to the political agitation of Islamist women, by the early 1990s, 
“restrictive barriers to women’s educational achievement and their employment 
were removed”;53 regressive family laws were repealed; and, surpassing any laws 
of the Pahlavi regime, a new law to compensate divorced wives for housework, 
was passed.54 Bolstered by their political successes, Islamist women in the early 
nineties began to build a formalized, feminist exegesis of the Quran.  
Islamist women, making use of the moralized space that the Islamic 
Revolution opened for female political actors, built a movement that can be 
described as “Islamic feminist”55 . This movement was primarily promulgated 
through a single female publication: Zanan, a popular women’s magazine. 56  
Zanan hosted a mix of articles concerning “religion, culture, law, and 
education”,57 but by far the most important topic it has covered with regards to 
feminism is that of ijtihad, independent reasoning and the right to reinterpretation 
of the Quran. Islamic feminists rely on ijtihad, a common practice among Shi’a 
mullahs, to advance a “feminist rereading of the sacred texts”.58 In doing so, 
Islamic feminists draw upon the explicitly religious and moralized public space 
that the revolution created, engaging with the discourse of Islam that the 
revolution brought to Iran. More importantly, though, reinterpretation of the 
Quran represents a radical reclaiming of what was once a system of oppression. In 
                                                        
50 Halper, 112 
51 Halper, 120 
52 Halper, 120 
53 Moghadam, 1140 
54 Halper, 100 
55 Moghadam, 1140 
56 Moghadam, 1144 
57 Moghadam, 1144 
58 Ahmadi, 36 
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reclaiming the Quran, Islamic feminists assert the goals and needs of women in 
Iran while also remaining within the bounds of their faith. Islamic feminism, then, 
is both a rejection of the Western values, so despised during the Pahlavi years, 
and a rejection of Orientalist constructions of the Islamic woman as utterly 
oppressed and lacking agency. It is an entirely indigenous form of feminism, 
owned and articulated by Iranian women. 
 
Beginning with the Tobacco Boycott and Constitutional Revolution of 
1905 until the early 1990s, women and the politics of gender have been on the 
forefront of the Iranian national consciousness. In the Tobacco Boycott and 
Constitutional Revolution, women first demonstrated political and organizational 
power. Unfortunately, the two events also catalyzed clerical opposition to 
women’s rights as an immoral and corrupting Western influence that had no place 
in Iran. Thus, despite their valiant efforts, women were not given an equal 
treatment in the constitution of 1906. Further efforts to emancipate women came 
as part of a state-controlled march towards Western modernity during the Pahlavi 
dynasty. Both Pahlavis, elder and junior, believed that the appearance of women’s 
emancipation was necessary in order to achieve a desired, Western modernity in 
Iran. However, Reza Shah Pahlavi’s unveiling law served to alienate the vast 
majority of Iranian women, as well the country’s clerical establishment, from the 
regime’s goal of Western modernity, while concurrently dismantling all arms of 
the independent women’s movement in the country—isolating women in their 
homes and barring them from public participation. Likewise, Mohammed Reza 
Shah’s 1963 White Revolution, of which women’s suffrage was a crucial 
component, brought harsh clerical opposition, in part due to the widely 
understood catalysis of the White Revolution from Western pressure. The end 
result of the Pahlavi attempts at modernization was both the construction in the 
public imaginary of the Westoxicated 59  woman, a corrupt woman who was 
destroying the moral and material fabric of Iranian society, and the galvanization 
of the clerical establishment to redefine women’s political participation in Islamic 
terms during the 1979 revolution.  
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 opened new allowed women to engage 
with traditional Iran within a common, religious discourse. During the revolution, 
women’s political participation was encouraged by Islamist revolutionaries. 
Despite earlier opposition to women’s suffrage and political participation, during 
the revolution clerical leaders sanctioned female participation as moral and 
divine. After the revolution, the Islamic government had to engage with religious, 
political women precisely because it had already approved of their political 
identities. Thus, in the face of the eradication of protective laws, women were 
                                                        
59 Paidar, 213 
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able to advocate for themselves and push through procedural and legal changes 
that afforded them rights equal to those under the Shah by 1992. 
The lionization and approval of women’s political and religious action in 
post-revolutionary Iran allowed some women to engage in a constructive 
reinterpretation of the Quran throughout the early 1990s. This new, feminist 
exegesis posited that the Quran is a living text, which can and should be 
understood through a temporal lens, allowing for the development of what some 
scholars have called an “Islamic feminism”, or a feminism that holds as crucial its 
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